这是德意志银行关于全球贸易失衡的第三篇报告。报告指出，贸易失衡并非新现象，但当前失衡的独特之处在于缺少与之对应的金融机制来对冲单边贸易流动。过去"布雷顿森林体系II"通过亚洲央行将贸易顺差回收进美元资产，如今该机制已明显减弱：中国官方外汇储备自2014年后不再上升，私人部门与企业也相继停止累积美元安全资产，韩国、台湾的顺差更多流向美国股市而非国债。随着顺差回收动能消退，调整压力更多落在资产价格上，从而推动人民币走强，并加剧中国低利率与美国高利率之间的分化。报告认为，全球贸易失衡短期内仍将延续，而BW2曾提供的稳定融资条件已显著弱化且难以恢复，因此全球利率高企与汇率波动加剧的局面可能持续，宏观金融环境与上世纪70年代高度相似，国际货币体系或已进入新的波动时代。是否存在体系终结抑或仅为暂时扰动，报告尚未给出定论，将留待后续研究。
Trade imbalances are not new; they have occurred periodically throughout post-war history. But what makes today's imbalances unique is the apparent absence of a corresponding financial system to offset the one-sided trade flows. The Bretton Woods II system, which helped recycle USD trade receipts from surplus countries back into the US financial system, is no longer functioning as it did in the past. This is the third note on global trade imbalances. The answer lies not in the imbalance itself, but in the accompanying financial mechanism. This financing—the so-called Bretton Woods II system that recycled Asia's surpluses into USD safe assets—has diminished significantly. As the recycling of surpluses becomes less dependable, more of the adjustment falls on market prices, which is seen as a force behind a stronger renminbi and the divergence between low Chinese interest rates and higher US yields. Consequently, elevated global interest rates and high exchange-rate volatility are likely